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Abstract
Traditional asset pricing models predict that covariance between prices of differ-
ent assets should be lower than what we observe in the data. This model generates
high covariance within a rational expectations framework by introducing markets for
information about asset payoffs. When information is costly, rational investors will not
buy information about all assets; they will learn about a subset. Because information
production has high fixed costs, competitive producers charge more for low-demand
information than for high-demand information. A price that declines in quantity makes
investors want to purchase a common subset of information. If investors price many
assets using a common subset of information, then a shock to one signal is passed on
as a common shock to many asset prices. These common shocks to asset prices gen-
erate ‘excess covariance.’ The cross-sectional and time-series properties of asset price
covariance are consistent with this explanation.
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Asset pricing theory tells us that the price of an asset today should equal the expected
present discounted value of the asset’s payoffs. Standard stochastic discount factors have
difficulty pricing assets, both over time and in the cross-section. An enormous amount of
research has explored modifications of the standard stochastic discount factor with the goal of
reconciling theory and data. Comparatively little attention has been paid to the expectations
operator and the origin of the information sets that it rests on. This paper relaxes the
assumption that investors have unlimited costless access to information and considers what
kinds of information portfolios rational investors would hold. Exploring optimal information
acquisition can yield important insights into cross-sectional asset pricing puzzles that arise
in macroeconomics, international economics and finance. One of these is the comovement
puzzle.
The high covariance of asset prices, relative to the covariance of their fundamentals,
seems to defy rational explanation (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1993; Barberis, Shleifer and
Wurgler, 2002). Many take this ‘excess covariance,’ or comovement, to be evidence of investor
irrationality. Zuckerman and Rao (2003) state,
If certain assets comove more than they should on the basis of their intrinsic
value, such segmentation would indicate that the market is less sophisticated
than imagined by the efficient markets hypothesis.
This paper offers an alternative explanation: Comovement is generated when investors pur-
chase asset-payoff-relevant information from an information market. A profit-maximizing
investor holding a portfolio of assets will typically not pay for information about every asset,
because information is expensive. Instead, he will buy information about a subset of the
assets and use this information to make inferences about the value of all the other assets.
Using common information to price diverse assets induces the prices to covary, more than
fundamentals would predict.
Consider the following example. Suppose the payoff to asset A was equal to the sum of
normally-distributed payoffs from two uncorrelated assets B and C. If investors purchase
information about the current-period payoff to A, but not information about B and C, then
when A’s payoff rises, investors will attribute some of the increase to B and some to C.
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Because they infer that the valuations of both assets rose, both prices will rise. If A’s payoffs
fall, the price of B and C will both fall. Prices of B and C will covary, even though investors
know their payoffs are uncorrelated. The common source of information adds a new common
shock in the prices of B and C, which causes apparent excess covariance in their prices and
their returns.
The question this raises is, why would investors all buy information about asset A and not
about assets B or C? A noisy rational expectations model with a fixed cost for purchasing
information (e.g. a multiple-signal version of Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) would predict
the opposite: investors should want signals that other investors are not purchasing. The
signals that other investors see can be deduced, imperfectly, by observing asset prices. So,
investors want different signals because they have more information content. With fixed-price
information, the demand for a given signal is a strategic substitute.
Introducing markets for information creates a strategic complementarity that works
through the market price for information. Information is a non-rival good with a high
fixed cost of discovery and a low marginal cost of replication. Producing a small number of
copies of a piece of information is very expensive, on a per-unit basis. Information that is
mass-produced can be produced cheaply, and therefore sold at a low price. This is consistent
with observed pricing schemes: A seminar for a small group of investors is expensive; a show
on MSNBC is broadcast almost for free. This decreasing price in quantity generates the
complementarity in information purchasing. Investors buy common information because the
information that everyone is buying is cheap.
Not only do information markets coordinate information purchases, but the signals co-
ordinated on are the signals most likely to produce comovement. In a competitive market
for information, suppliers provide the highest-value signals. The highest value signals have
the strongest predictive power for many other assets. Since it is these inferences about the
value of other assets that causes comovement, the stronger the predictive power, the more
comovement is generated.
Section 1 sets up a noisy rational expectations model with both the strategic substi-
tutability and strategic complementarity in information acquisition. Section 2 shows that
with fixed-cost information, investors’ information is dispersed; one information shock affects
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a small fraction of investors’ beliefs and generates a small amount of comovement. With in-
formation markets, information is concentrated on fewer signals; a shock to one signal can
be a shock to the beliefs of a large number of investors and can move the prices of all the
other assets in lock step. Numerical results show that common information shocks raise asset
price correlations 40% above the correlation predicted by a model where investors observe all
signals, and 30% above what a fixed-cost information model would predict. The first finding
highlights the difficulty in matching comovement, using only portfolio rebalancing effects
(as in Kodres and Pritsker 2002). Like liquidity (Calvo 1999) and wealth effects (Kyle and
Xiong 2001), rebalancing is quantitatively significant in a crisis, when asset values change
greatly, but generates only minor adjustments in response to normal daily fluctuations. The
latter result highlights the importance of the endogenous information price.
By analyzing the determinants of information acquisition, the model can explain time-
series and cross-sectional properties of comovement. Section 3 builds a model where demand
for information varies endogenously and shows that investors purchase more information
about high-value asset markets. The abundant information reduces comovement. This is
consistent with time-series evidence, showing that excess covariance is countercyclical and
cross-sectional evidence, showing that excess covariance is stronger in emerging markets
(Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000). Veldkamp (2003) provides direct evidence that when a mar-
ket’s assets are valuable, information about those assets is abundant in the financial press.
Since comovement arises when information is incomplete, what drives comovement changes
is change in information flow. The difference between this mechanism and Ribeiro and
Veronesi’s (2002) is that they hold the information flow fixed and vary the uncertainty of
priors over the business cycle. Finally, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) show that
between 1967-97, comovement decreased in the U.S.; Morck et. al. confirm this result in
emerging markets. Adding a falling information cost to the model could generate these
results.
Although the effects of information markets are explored in the context of an asset market,
the results carry some general messages relevant to macro and international economics. One
message is that the information agents choose to see can alter relationships between macro
aggregates. The literature applying global games to monetary economics (Woodford 2002),
3
business cycles (Angeletos and Pavan 2004, Lorenzoni 2004), and financial crises (Morris
and Shin 1998), has made great inroads explaining observed responses to macroeconomic
shocks, by adding private information. Analyzing information markets yields predictions
about how public or private observed information will be, as well as which particular signals
will be observed. Both the signal observed and the fraction of the population observing it
are important determinants of aggregate covariance. A second message is that the extent
of information frictions fluctuates with the value of the assets involved, be they financial
assets, physical capital, or currency. The reason for this is that information has increasing
returns in an asset’s value; one signal can forecast the payoff of $1 of asset value or $100. As
the value of an asset rises, so does the value of information about it. If agents choose how
much information to acquire, then when asset values are low, information will be scarce and
information frictions will be strong.
1 Model
The model is in the spirit of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). It adds multiple assets with
correlated payoffs and replaces Grossman and Stiglitz’ constant information price with an
endogenous price, set in an information market with increasing returns.
Preferences and Technology Time is discrete and continues forever. In each period
t, a large finite number of two-period-lived, ex-ante identical agents are born. They have
constant absolute risk aversion preferences over wealth (Wt+1).
U(Wt+1) = Et[−e−aWt+1 ] (1)
There are two types of assets: one riskless asset with payoff r > 1 and risky assets
indexed by m with payoff umt. Risky asset payoffs have a persistent component θmt and an
idiosyncratic component ²mt ∼ iidN(0, σ2² ).
umt = θmt + ²mt
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The persistent component of payoffs is an AR(1) process with mean µ and shocks η.
θmt = (1− ρ)µm + ρθm(t−1) + ηmt
Innovations η are jointly normally distributed: ηmt ∼ N(0,Σ), with covariances E[ηmηn] =
σmn, and common variance σ
2
ηt.
Information At the start of each period t, agent i chooses whether or not to buy infor-
mation about each asset. The information reveals the persistent component of next period’s
asset payoff (θmt). The asset payoff umt and the state θmt are revealed publicly at the end
of each period.
Asset Markets There are three risky assets. Risky asset m has price Pmt; the riskless
asset price is normalized to one. The per capita supply of the risky asset xmt is normally
distributed: xmt ∼ N(x¯, σ2x). This supply is never observed. However, agents who know θmt
can infer the value of xmt from the price. The role of the supply shocks is to prevent price
from perfectly revealing θmt to uninformed agents.
Information Markets Three features of information markets are crucial. First, informa-
tion is produced according to a fixed-cost technology. A signal θmt can be discovered at the
beginning of period t at a per-capita fixed cost χ. This can be interpreted as the cost of
hiring a journalist to interview people and find primary sources of information. The infor-
mation, once discovered, can be distributed to other traders at zero marginal cost. Second,
reselling purchased information is forbidden. The realistic counterpart to this assumption
is intellectual property law that prohibits copying a publication and re-distributing it for
profit. Third, there is free entry. Any agent can discover information at any time.
Information suppliers compete on price in a perfectly contestable market.1 Profits from
information discovery depend on the price charged and demand for information, given the
pricing strategies of other agents. One way to ensure that the market is contestable is to
1This market structure is used because it produces a simple pricing formula. Veldkamp (2003) shows that
Cournot or monopolistically competitive markets produce similar results.
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force agents to choose prices in a first stage and choose entry in a second stage. This is a
reasonable way to think of news markets where the price of the periodical is fixed well in
advance and then editors decide whether or not to supply a story. By supplying the story,
they would be entering the market for that piece of information.
Let dimt = 1 if agent i decides to discover information about market m in period t and
dimt = 0 otherwise. Let per capita demand for information with price cimt, given all other
posted prices for the same information c−imt, be I(·, ·). Then the objective of the information
producer is to maximize profit:
max
dimt,cimt
dimt(cimtI(cimt, c−imt)− χ). (2)
Order of Events
1. All agents enter the first period of life with wealth Wt, knowing the persistent compo-
nent of the period t asset payoff θt and σηt, the variance of θt, conditional on θt−1.
• Agents decide what price to set for information. Given all prices, they decide
whether to discover information about each asset.
• Agents choose whether or not to purchase information about each asset m that
reveals θmt.
• Informed and uninformed agents demand DIm and DUm units of the risky asset.
2. Payoffs are received. The asset supply xmt and the asset payoff umt, with its persistent
and transitory components θmt, and ²mt are revealed.
3. In the second period of life, agents derive utility from terminal wealth Wt+1.
Equilibrium
Given an initial wealth, a persistent asset payoff process, payoff shocks, and risky asset
supply, {θt, ²t, xt}∞t=1, an equilibrium is a sequence of risky asset demands and a fraction
of investors who purchase information {Dimt, λmt}∞t=1, and asset prices, information prices
{Pmt, cmt}∞t=1, such that in every period t > 0
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1. Given prices {Pmt, cmt}, agents choose whether to buy information about market m
(Iimt = 1), or not (Iimt = 0), and choose asset demands to maximize expected utility
(1), subject to their budget constraint,2
Wt+1 = rWt +
M∑
m=1
(Dimtumt − r(PmtDimt − Iimtcjmt)) + piit.
λt is the fraction of agents who buy information. piit is the profit agent i makes from
selling information.
2. Information supply and pricing strategies are a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
They solve equation (2). If there are multiple Nash equilibria, information suppliers
coordinate on the equilibrium that generates the highest total welfare for information
purchasers.3
3. The markets for risky assets and information clear.
2 Information Provision and Price Covariance
Rather than begin with the information and price dynamics produced by the full model, I
begin by solving a series of simpler models that each highlight the role of one additional
assumption in the model. Working with the simplified models also yields interpretable
analytical results. Analyzing the full model requires numerical solution methods.
2.1 Exogenous Information Supply
A simple starting case is where all agents observe information about one asset ([λ1, λ2, λ3] =
[1, 0, 0]). Since endogenizing information supply with competitive information markets will
2Because of constant absolute risk aversion preferences, end-of-period information revelation, and the
Markov state process, maximizing next period utility would also be optimal for an infinitely-lived agent.
3In a monopolistic competition model where information supply was not perfectly competitive and sup-
pliers could earn some profit, this would be the highest-profit outcome. See Veldkamp (2004) for a analysis
of such a model. In most cases, coordinating on other equilibria would affect which assets comove, but not
the aggregate extent of comovement. Since the issue of multiple equilibria is a tangential one here, I choose
to rule the possibility out, by assumption.
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cause agents to cluster their information demands, and this is the extreme form of clustering,
it is a useful benchmark.4 Results will compare the covariance of asset prices in this model
with two alternatives: covariance of prices in a model with full information (λm = 1 ∀m),
and the covariance of prices in a model with no information (λm = 0 ∀m). The main result
is that when the payoff covariance of two assets is sufficiently low, price covariance in this
model will exceed both alternative measures of covariance.
When agents all have the same information set, the vector of prices takes the following
form:
Pt =
1
R
(E[θt]− aVar[ut]xt) (3)
where the expectation and variance-covariance matrix are conditional on the information set
of the agents.
Full Information With full information, θmt is known for all assets m and each asset’s
price can be written as
P FImt =
1
R
(
θmt − axmtσ2²
)
. (4)
The covariance between the prices of assets 2 and 3 is
cov(P FI2 , P
FI
3 ) =
σ23
R2(1− ρ2) . (5)
The σ23/(1 − ρ2) term appears because σ23 is the covariance of innovations to an AR(1)
process θ with persistence ρ. The covariance of the AR(1) process is 1/(1 − ρ2) times the
covariance of its innovations.
No Information With no information, all knowledge about θt is based on its (t − 1)
realization.
PNIt =
1
R
(
(1− ρ)µ+ ρθ(t−1) − a(Σ + σ2² I)x
)
. (6)
4Ribeiro and Veronesi (2002) employ a similar information structure.
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The covariance between the prices of assets 2 and 3 is
cov(PNI2 , P
NI
3 ) =
ρ2σ23
R2(1− ρ2) +
a2σ2x
R2
(
σ12σ13 + 2σ23(σ
2
η + σ
2
² )
)
(7)
The first term is what price covariance would be if agents did not adjust their portfolios over
time. It is just the covariance of 1
R
θˆ2 and
1
R
θˆ3. The second term arises from agents who try
to manage risk by adjusting their portfolios when prices change.
Information About One Asset When agents all observe θ1t, the price of asset 1 is the
full information price pFI1t . The prices of assets 2 and 3 change. Let θˆmt denote the (t − 1)
expectation (1− ρ)µ+ ρθm(t−1). For assets m ² {2, 3}, the expected value of θm conditional
on observing θ1 is
E[θmt|θ1t] = θˆmt + σ1m
σ2η
(θ1t − θˆ1t). (8)
The price and the payoffs of the asset that investors learn about will always have the same
covariance with all other assets. This is because the optimal inference weights the innovation
to θ1 by its covariance with asset m. An optimal linear forecast always matches this moment.
When investors learn about asset 1, there will be no ’excess comovement’ between assets 1
and 2, or assets 1 and 3. The interesting comparison will be across the covariances of asset
prices 2 and 3 that result from each information regime.
The vector of prices will be
Pt =
1
R
(E[θt|θ1t]− aV Ixmt) (9)
where V I is the conditional variance-covariance of asset payoffs.
V I = V ar[ut|θ1] =

σ2² 0 0
0 σ2η + σ
2
² − σ
2
12
σ2η
σ23 − σ12σ13σ2η
0 σ23 − σ12σ13σ2η σ
2
η + σ
2
² − σ
2
13
σ2η
 (10)
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The covariance between prices P2 and P3, is
cov(P2, P3) =
1
R2
[
ρ2
1− ρ2σ23 +
σ12σ13
σ2η
+ a2σ2xV
I
23(V
I
22 + V
I
33)
]
(11)
The first term is the covariance between fundamentals, forecasted on the basis of last period’s
information. The second term is the covariance induced by forecasting the fundamentals of
assets 2 and 3, using information about asset 1. The higher the covariance of each asset with
asset 1, the stronger the inference made about the asset’s value, and the more covariance
generated by the inference problem. The final term arises because investors rebalance their
portfolios to manage risk.
Proposition 1 Comovement Relative to Full Information: If σ23 <
σ12σ13
σ2η
, then
the covariance of asset prices 2 and 3 is higher than it would be given full information:
cov(P2, P3) > cov(P
FI
2 , P
FI
3 )
Proof : The result follows from equations (5) and (11). 2
The sufficient condition is that the correlation of innovations to the payoff process for
assets m and n is less than the product of each asset’s correlation with the information. If an
investor observes a θ1 that is η1 units higher than he expected it to be, then he will revise his
beliefs about θ2 and θ3 upward by
σ12
σ2η
and σ13
σ2η
, respectively. The covariance between σ12
σ2η
and
σ13
σ2η
is the right side of the inequality. If making inferences based on observations of signal
one generates more covariance than the covariance between fundamentals (σ23), then excess
price covariance results. The left panel of figure 1 shows the region of parameter values that
generate excess covariance.
The requirement that payoff covariance between assets be small fits with the empirical
excess correlation literature which focuses on price covariance between assets that appear
unrelated. Pindyck and Rotemberg’s (1993) original comovement test works with groups of
assets whose earnings, after removing aggregate macroeconomic factors, have statistically
insignificant correlation. It is exactly between these kinds of assets where payoff correlation
is very low that the excess correlation generated by common information has the largest
effect.
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This condition also makes sense from the perspective of an information purchaser. The
asset that you would most want to have information on is the asset with the highest correla-
tions with the other assets. This signal will have the greatest predictive power. If information
purchase was endogenous and signal 1 was chosen, we would expect σ12 and σ13 to be high
relative to σ23.
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Figure 1: Regions of covariance parameters that generate excess price covariance between assets 2 and 3
relative to a full-information and a no-information benchmark. Axis labels are correlations (σmn/σ2η). Black
region covers inadmissable parameters that produce non-positive variance-covariance matrices. Parameters:
R = 1.02, µ = 1, ρ = 0.86, σ2η = 0.12, x¯ = 1, vx = 0.5, σ² = 0.132, a = 1.5.
If the point of comparison is instead a no-information price, where agents only observe
past states and prices, then the conditions for excess price covariance change. When no-
information payoff variance (σ2η + σ
2
² ) is not too large, price covariance between assets 2 and
3 is small.
Proposition 2 Comovement Relative to No Information: If
σ23 <
σ12σ13
σ212 + σ
2
13
(
1 + a2σ2x(σ
2
η + 2(σ
2
η + σ
2
² )−
1
σ2η
(σ212 + σ
2
13))
)
, (12)
then the covariance of asset prices 2 and 3 is higher than it would be given no information:
cov(P2, P3) > cov(P
NI
2 , P
NI
3 )
Proof : The result follows from comparing equations (7) and (11). 2
When agents learn about all assets, then the only risk comes from transitory ² shocks,
which are independent across assets. When agents learn about only one asset, payoff risk is
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comprised partly of correlated shocks to θ. When risk across assets is correlated, investors
adjust portfolios to reduce covariance (diversify) and minimize risk. These portfolio adjust-
ments dampen price covariance. The right panel of figure 1 shows the results of the numerical
example: any admissible set of covariances generates excess price covariance, relative to a
no-information benchmark.
2.2 Introducing Asymmetric Information
Next, consider the case where θ1 is observed by a fraction λ of the investors. As before,
no investors see θ2 or θ3. As soon as investors have different information sets, some will
look to the price level as a signal of the information observed by others. Since the observed
value of θ1 will affect informed traders’ demand for all three assets, all three asset prices
are informative signals for the uninformed. This section describes how uninformed agents
solve their signal extraction problem and how the degree of asymmetry changes the extent
of comovement.
There are two problems that must be solved simultaneously. The first question is: how
do prices depend on fundamentals θt and xt? The second problem is to discover what the
optimal set of beliefs are for each type of agent, upon observing the price vector Pt.
The solution involves first postulating a linear rule for risky asset prices5
Pt = At +Btηt + Ct(xt − x¯).
where ηt is a vector of innovations to the persistent component of payoff θt and (xt − x¯) is
a vector of unexpected asset supply shocks. Given this linear price rule, each agent solves a
Kalman filtering problem to obtain expectations E[θt|Fit, Pt], as well as the variance of that
expectation. While the price rule comprises the observation equation and is common to all
agents, the state equation depends on the agent’s information set Fit
ηt = E[ηt|Fit] + V ar[ηt|Fit]1/2νt (13)
5This solution method is similar to that used by Admati (1985). However, this problem is distinct
because Admati’s agents all received different signals with identical variance. Here, the variance of agents’
prior beliefs differs depending on whether they are informed or not.
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where νt ∼ N(0, 1).
To solve for the coefficients At, Bt, and Ct, and verify that price is linear, use the asset
market clearing condition. Each agent’s asset demand depends on their conditional expecta-
tion and variance of the assets’ payoffs, as well as on the priceDit = (a V ar[ut|Fit])−1 (E[ut|Fit]−
rP ). Setting the weighted sum of all asset demands equal to the total asset supply yields
the equilibrium price equation
P =
1
R
Vλ(
∑
i
λiV ar[ut|Fit, Pt]−1E[ut|Fit, Pt]−1 − axt)
where Vλ = (
∑
i λiV ar[ut|Fit, Pt]−1)−1 and i indexes the information portfolio. This pricing
equation can be rewritten as a linear function of ηt and (xt− x¯). Matching coefficients yields
implicit solutions for At, Bt and Ct. where B and C solve
B = [λV −1I R + (1− λ)V −1U (R−Kt)]−1λV −1I B (14)
C =
−aσ2x
R
[λV −1I R + (1− λ)V −1U (R−Kt)]−1. (15)
The term Kt is the Kalman gain: Kt = ΣB
′(BΣB+σ2xCC
′)−1. The variance of asset payoffs
(ut), conditional on observed prices, for the uninformed agent is VU = Σ − KtBΣ + σ2² I.
Finally, At is the expected value of the price.
6
Given this solution method for asset prices, we can now ask how the prices change when
the amount of information λ1 varies. Assuming that no agents are informed about assets 2
and 3, increasing the number of agents that observe information about asset 1 will increase
price covariance. The reason is that the excess covariance is generated by people observing
information about asset 1 and making correlated inferences about assets 2 and 3. The more
people who observe the information and the more precise the information they observe, the
stronger the inferences they will make.
Proposition 3 Informing more agents increases comovement. If (12) holds, then
6The coefficients Bt and Ct cannot be solved for explicitly. However, a numerical algorithm that begins
with a guess for B and C and then iterates on equations 14 and 15 until convergence, will produce a solution.
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there exists a non-empty set Λ inside [0, 1] such that for λ2 = λ3 = 0 and all λ1 ² Λ,
cov(P2, P3) is increasing in λ1.
Proofs of this and all further propositions are in the appendix.
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Figure 2: Regions of excess covariance, relative to full-information prices, for three values of λ, the fraction
of the population that is informed. Increasing the number of informed agents increases the range of parame-
ters that generate excess covariance. Axis labels are correlations (σmn/σ2η). Black region covers inadmissable
parameters that produce non-positive variance-covariance matrices. Parameters: R = 1.02, µ = 1, ρ = 0.86,
x¯ = 1, vx = 0.5, a = 1.5, σ2η = 0.1
2, σ2² = 0.13
2.
Figure 2 shows a numerical example where, as the fraction of the population that observes
θ1 rises, so does the excess covariance of prices 2 and 3. As more people become informed,
the asset prices reveal more information, and investors make stronger inferences about the
appropriate prices of assets 2 and 3, based on the signal θ1.
2.3 Properties of the Information Market
Two properties of information markets are critical in generating comovement: Investors buy
common signals, and the signal that they buy are the ones that can generate the largest
excess covariance. The common signals result from price complementarity in information
markets. The signals chosen are not a result of the information market structure, but follow
from the desire to minimize payoff variance.
Result 1 In equilibrium, information suppliers will price all information at its average cost.
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Free entry at the stage where prices are set ensures that all profits are competed away; zero
profit implies average cost pricing. The fact that the price of information declines in the
quantity of people who buy it is critical because it creates a complementarity: Investors want
to buy the same information because that information is cheap. It is this information com-
plementarity that will cause investors in the multiple signal model to hold largely identical
information portfolios and pass on common shocks to many asset prices.
Taking the price of information as given, how to agents choose information demand? Since
all agents are identical ex-ante, λi ² (0, 1) is an equilibrium when all agents are indifferent
between buying signal i or not: E[u(W It+1)] = E[u(W
U
t+1)] where W
I and WU denote the
wealth of informed and uninformed agents.
What is the optimal order in which signals are provided? The highest-value signals
are the ones that reduce the variance of total payoffs by the largest amount. Suppose an
investor holds a portfolio with a vector of weights α on each asset. Then, if V is the variance-
covariance matrix of payoffs, the variance of the portfolio will be α′V α. The question is,
how much does each signal reduce this variance? Signal i reduces the portfolio variance by
α′(Σ− V I)α = αi(αiσ2η + 2αjσij + 2αkσik) + α2j
σ2ij
σ2η
+ 2αjαk
σijσik
σ2η
+ α2k
σ2ik
σ2η
(16)
The three terms in parentheses describe how removing θi as a risk factor directly decreases
variance. The second three terms describe how observing θi allows investors to make better
predictions about θj and θk and reduce variance indirectly.
This result tells us that two properties of a signal make it useful in reducing variance.
The first property is that you expect to hold lots of the signal (high αi). Ex-ante, all agents
are identical. Each must hold 1/3rd of the stock of each asset. So, ex-ante differences in
α’s are not explaining information demand. The second property is that the signal has high
covariance with the other signals (σij, σik large). The signal chosen therefore is the one with
the strongest power to predict other signals. Proposition 2.1 tells us that excess covariance
arises when σijσik
σ2η
is larger than σjk. So, this signal with the highest covariances with the
other two signals is the signal most capable of generating excess covariance and the first
signal that information markets will supply.
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2.4 The Full Model with Multiple Signals
There are two properties of the multiple-signal model of particular interest. First, how does
observing multiple signals affect excess covariance? Second, what do the optimal information
portfolios looks like, and how do they differ from fixed-information-cost portfolios? Section
2.2 demonstrated that as the information market deepens, and demand for one signal rises,
comovement increases. In contrast, as information demand broadens and more signals are
purchased, comovement declines. With fixed-cost information, signals that other agents don’t
observe are more valuable. Therefore, information demand is broad and comovement is low.
With endogenous-cost information markets, investors will buy high demand information,
even though it is less valuable, because it is cheap. Information demand will be deep and
comovement high.
As the variety of signals purchased rises, asset prices approach their full-information
levels and excess covariance disappears.
Proposition 4 Comovement Falls When More Signals Are Observed. If λ1 = 1,
λ3 = 0, and σ23 <
σ12σ13
σ2η
, then cov(P2, P3) is decreasing in λ2 over some non-empty interval
Λ ⊂ (0, 1).
If information becomes more abundant, there are two competing effects. More people
becoming informed about one asset increases excess covariance. But, if information demand
starts spilling over into other assets, price covariance falls. Price covariance can arise where
there are two assets whose values are not directly observed by some agents, but are being
inferred on the basis of some common information. In the simple case where there are three
assets, this means that comovement arises primarily when only one asset is being learned
about. When investors start learning about two assets, only one price is being determined
based on inference, and comovement cannot arise. As the number of assets (N) grows,
comovement will still be strongest when most agents observe one signal. In that case there
are (N − 1) assets all being priced based on the same signal. As more signals are observed,
fewer assets are susceptible to comovement, and the ones that are will be priced based on more
nuanced, and less common information. The comovement effect will diminish and eventually
disappear when (N −2) signals are observed. In short, excess price covariance arose because
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of an incomplete information problem. When information becomes more complete, the effect
disappears.
Proposition 4 also highlights the importance of information markets in the model. If
agents purchased many different signals in equilibrium, price covariance would be similar to
that in a full-information model. Price would just have some extra idiosyncratic noise.
Unfortunately, information demands cannot be neatly characterized in analytical form.
The solution relies on the extent to which investors can learn from the price level, which in
turn depends on the price rule. However, the expressions for the price rule in equations (14)
and (15) can be solved numerically in seconds, but cannot be used to analytically express the
equilibrium information demand. The reason for the complexity lies in information decision
problem: a seven-dimensional optimization problem with both strategic complementarity
and substitutability. The problem is distinct from the one-asset solution method employed
in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Models where information is exogenous (e.g. Kodres and
Pritsker 2001, and Admati 1985) also do not run into these technical dilemmas. To under-
stand the nature of the information portfolios, we’ll have to turn to numerical simulation
results.
2.5 Calibration and Simulation
Numerical examples will illustrate the interesting features of the model’s information portfo-
lios. To make these numerical results realistic, model parameters are matched to asset pricing
moments from the S&P 500. The payoff autocorrelation parameter ρ is 0.86, matching the
price autocorrelation.7 The variance of the persistent payoff innovation ση determines both
the Sharpe ratio and the equity premium. This model, like most, cannot match both statis-
tics. The benchmark value is σ2η = 0.1
2, an intermediate value that generates a Sharpe ratio
of 2.6 and an equity premium of 3%. Section 3.1 explores a range of values between 0.0252
and 0.22. The transitory payoff shock ² makes payoffs more volatile, but is never learned
and therefore never incorporated into prices. Therefore, a natural moment to match σ2² to
is the ratio of return variance to price variance (0.62 in the data); this yields σ2² = 0.13
2.
7Since a positive trend in prices will inflate their correlation as well as their variance, I first detrend prices
using a loglinear trend. The data is yearly returns and average price levels from 1946-2003.
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The variance of the asset supply shock σ2x, together with the cost of information, determines
how much information will be held in equilibrium. For excess covariance to have a fighting
chance in a three-asset model, most agents must purchase one signal in equilibrium. There-
fore (σ2x = 0.5) and χ = 0.1 were chosen so that the average number of signals purchased is
0.95. The real return on a risk-free asset is 2%. Absolute risk aversion a is 1.5, producing
an average relative risk aversion of 4.5. The mean asset payoff and average number of shares
per capita do not affect second moments. They are both set to 1.
The last question is: What should the correlation structure of the three assets be? There
are no population moments, only specific examples. Payoff correlations are matched to
the correlation of dividends of three S&P500 firms. The firms, Nordstrom (retail), Pitney-
Bowes (business services) and Sysco (food services), exhibit the pattern of excess covariance
predicted by my model: Pitney and Sysco both have high correlation with Nordstrom (0.705
and 0.500), a low dividend correlation with each other (0.201), and a price covariance much
higher than would be predicted by their fundamentals (0.524). Based on this example, the
model’s asset payoffs have correlations of 0.7, 0.5 and 0.2.
Optimal information portfolios are selected by simulating a 20-agent market and asking
what expected utility an agent would have achieved with each signal combination. An
equilibrium is a set of information portfolios such that no agent would achieve a higher
utility with any other signal, given the signals other agents are holding. The search algorithm
begins with initial information portfolios and then lets agents optimize sequentially, holding
other agents’ information fixed, until no agent wants to change his portfolio.
2.6 Numerical Results: Information Portfolios and Comovement
Three interesting features of optimal information portfolios stand out: information demand
is clustered; the optimal signals maximize comovement, and information demand can shift
suddenly. To examine each feature, let’s look at a sequence of optimal information portfolios
as the variance of payoffs σ2η is increased. Recall that as σ
2
η rises, so does the value of
information. In the top panel of figure 3, a vertical slice of the graph depicts an equilibrium
information portfolio for a given payoff variance.
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Figure 3: Distribution of information portfolios over the population, for varying levels of asset payoff risk.
For a given variance parameter, a vertical slice of this graph tells you what fraction of the population buys
each signal. With information markets, demand is concentrated on a smaller set of signals.
When variance is very low and uncertainty is low, agents buy no signals. When they do
start to buy signals, a large fraction of the population all buy the same signal. This is the
clustering of information demand, concentrated on a small number of signals, that ensures
that the same shocks to signals get passed on to prices of all three assets. As variance rises,
agents switch from buying signal 1 to buying signals 2 and 3, to eventually buying all 3
signals. The reason for this pattern is that asset 1 has the highest correlation with the
other two assets. If you want to predict the payoffs of all three assets based on one signal,
signal 1 has the strongest predictive power. When buying two signals, signals 2 and 3 are
optimal because they are both good at predicting the payoff of asset 1. More generally,
when information is not very valuable, it is optimal to purchase a few signals that are highly
correlated with many assets. When information demand rises, a more diversified information
portfolio that focuses on hard-to-predict assets yields higher payoffs.
The shift between a market focus on a few important summary statistics and a more
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nuanced approach to evaluating many individual assets can happen quite suddenly. The
sudden switch is because of the endogenous information price. If the price per signal was
constant, regardless of how many people bought it, then information demand would be a
continuous function that gradually declined as σ2η fell. With an endogenous information
price, few people purchasing θ1 makes the signal very expensive. When an increase in the
variance makes information more valuable and demand rises, the price of information falls.
This causes a discrete shift to a regime where many investors buy the signal and this is
optimal because the signal is very cheap.
The effect of discrete information shifts will resemble the paradigm shift of Hong and
Stein (2003). In that setting, investors switch focus from one set of indicators to another
because they are changing the model they use to forecast. Here, shifts come from changes
in the information sets agents choose to acquire. The shifts in themselves are interesting
because they could be triggered by small events and would have large consequences for the
cross-section of asset prices.
Contrast the portfolios purchased from information markets with the bottom panel of
figure 3, where the cost of information is fixed.8 The average number of signals per person is
not very different in the two models. But, instead of having many agents concentrate their
demand on a small number of signals, there are fewer agents buying many signals. Agents
diversify their information portfolios when information costs are fixed because information
that is not already held and not already reflected in the price is more valuable. Recall that
excess covariance is strongest when a large fraction of agents hold the same small subset of
signals. Thus, diversity of information in the fixed-cost model dampens the common shocks
to prices and washes away most excess price covariance.
How much comovement can these information portfolios generate? When the payoff vari-
ance is σ2η = 0.1
2, as in the calibrated model, then 95% of agents purchase signal 1 and excess
covariance is 0.0015. Since covariance arises partly because the variance of price changes,
it is useful to isolate comovement by looking at correlations. The correlation between the
prices of assets 2 and 3 is 43% higher than it would be if agents had a full set of signals, and
8The price of a signal in the fixed-information-cost model is equal to the average signal price paid in the
endogenous cost model: χ/0.8.
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is 108% higher than the correlation in the asset payoffs. Comovement is present, even when
there is full information, because agents rebalance the risk in their portfolios in response to
news, affecting their demand for unrelated assets. However, this effect is tiny.
With the fixed information cost portfolio, comovement still appears, but is only 7.1%
higher than for the full-information price. The reason correlation is so low is that when
different agents hold different information portfolios, they make different prediction errors
about asset values that cancel each other out in the market price. Only when many agents
are making the same inference errors will comovement be strong.
The extent of the correlation in the asset price still does not match the correlation in
the prices of Sysco and Pitney, in the data example (excess of 108% in the model vs. 161%
in the data). However, some of that price covariance could be explained by forces absent
in this model, such as macroeconomic fluctuations that affect the stochastic discount factor
used to price all assets.
Does this excess covariance show up in returns as well? Yes, it does. The return is the
asset payoff divided by its price (umt
Pmt
). For the information markets model, the correlation
between the returns on assets 2 and 3 is 28%, while for the fixed-cost information and full
information models, the correlation is almost zero (< 0.3%).
In a model with only 3 assets, the region that generates excess covariance appears to be
quite limited. However, in a richer model with N assets, excess covariance will be possible
whenever agents are purchasing between 1 and N − 2 of the signals. (See section 2.4.) With
more assets, the range of parameters that generates excess covariance will grow.
3 Related Issues
3.1 Business Cycle Variation in Comovement
Patterns of comovement change over the business cycle. In particular, comovement is higher
in recessions than in booms (Ribeiro and Veronesi 2002, Zuckerman and Rao 2003). Can
the model match this fact?
As the model is formulated right now, there is no force causing information demand to
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fluctuate. This is because the variance of payoff innovations σ2η was held fixed, for simplic-
ity. For information provision to vary systematically over the business cycle, the level and
variance of asset payoffs (θt) need to be tied together. The most natural way to think of
the effect of increasing the payoff level is to think of issuing more shares of the asset. If you
hold a given fraction of the assets and the number of shares rises, the mean and standard
deviation of the payoffs rise proportionately. If you scale the standard deviation of payoff
innovations up and down with the existing payoff level θˆt−1 each period, the resulting payoff
process is
θmt = (1− ρ)µm + ρθm(t−1) + θm(t−1)ηmt. (17)
Risk, the ratio of the standard deviation of future payoffs to the current payoff, stays con-
stant, while the total variance (θ2tσ
2
η) of the payoff fluctuates.
If total variance rises, information becomes more valuable and therefore more abundant.
Why does total variance determine information demand? Total variance is the product of
risk and the asset value. Risk matters because information on a very stable payoff process is
not nearly as useful as information on a payoff that varies greatly. The asset value matters
because it determines how much is at risk. Information here has increasing returns. You
can use one piece of information to evaluate a little bit of an asset or you can use the same
signal to value a large amount of asset value. You get more mileage out of information that
is used to evaluate a higher value asset. The same effect was present when we examined
what signals most reduced variance (equation 16). Holding more shares of an asset made
learning about that asset more valuable. Likewise, holding more value in an asset also makes
information about that asset more valuable.
Increasing information provision when asset values are high has two competing effects on
comovement. One effect is to make more people learn about the same subset of assets. If the
fraction of informed people rises, existing comovement will be made stronger (proposition
2.2). The other effect is to make information available about a broader class of assets.
This would reduce the extent to which investors use information about one asset to make
inference about others and reduce the extent of comovement (proposition 4). If broadening
the information set is a stronger force than enlarging the size of the informed population, then
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as payoffs and risk rise, comovement will fall; prices will exhibit countercyclical comovement.
From figure 3, it is clear that more variance has a weak effect on the number of informed
agents and a much stronger effect on the number of signals purchased. It is the region where
many agents purchase signal 1 and almost no agents purchase other signals (ση between 0.04
and 0.11), where excess covariance between the prices of assets 2 and 3 will arise. When
payoff variance is very low and no signals are purchased, prices will be based only on past
observations; this will not generate any excess covariance. Likewise, when payoff variance is
high and all agents are buying two or three signals, there are not two assets whose prices
are determined by inference. Only in the intermediate range, where most agents are buying
one signal, can the covariance between two prices exceed the full-information covariance.
Therefore, if the mean value of ση is 0.1, comovement is more likely when asset prices are
below average, than when they are above average. This is the source of the model’s counter-
cyclical comovement.
How much more comovement is generated in bad times than in good times? Figure 4
shows how the correlation between the prices of assets 2 and 3 changes as the expected
asset payoff (θˆt) grows. I use correlations here instead of covariances because the entire
environment is becoming more volatile as ση grows. The correlation is high in the region
where many agents are purchasing signal 1 and low in the regions where information is very
scarce, or where multiple signals are abundant. The mean of the asset payoff is 1. Therefore,
when times are bad and asset payoffs are low, excess correlation (the difference between
information market and full-information covariance) is high.
Of course, choosing a different mean for ση could easily produce the opposite conclusion,
that comovement increases in good times. However, if you extend this logic to a larger class
of assets, comovement will be strongest when all investors use only one signal to price all
assets. As the number of signals rises, and investors construct more accurate forecasts of
payoffs, comovement falls. It is only the case where people switch from seeing no signals to
seeing one signal that comovement increases with the information supplied. Certainly in the
U.S., the idea that many people stop learning anything about equity markets in downturns
seems implausible. If people buy fewer signals in downturns, but still buy at least one signal,
then downturns should be times of high comovement.
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tion models. Excess correlation is the distance between the dotted and starred lines with the solid line.
Information markets make excess correlation rise and then fall with asset payoffs.
3.2 Twin Stocks
Sometimes the same asset trades on two different markets. The price of the same asset on
each market comoves more with its own market than with its twin asset (Froot and Dabora
1999). Hardouvelis, La Porta and Wizman (1994) document the same pattern of closed-end
country funds having higher covariance with the market they are traded in than with the
market where their underlying assets are traded. This theory says that the other assets in
traders’ portfolios should affect the price of a single asset. The reason is that these other
assets determine what set of information traders purchase. An asset that is traded by people
who learn lots of information about US stocks will have more covariance with US stocks and
an asset traded by people who learn primarily about UK stocks will have more covariance
with UK assets.
If you took an asset in this model and put it in a market with two other assets that you
call US assets, and then you took the same asset with the same sequence of payoff shocks
and put it in a market with two different assets that you call UK assets, the covariance of
the asset in each setting changes substantially. Call the twin asset listed on both markets T
with prices PUST and P
UK
T . It is a claim to the same payoff in every period and is subject
to identical asset supply shocks in both markets. In each market, there are two additional
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assets, which are not common. In the US, there are assets S1 and S2 with prices PS1 and
PS2. In the UK, there are assets K1 and K2 with prices PK1 and PK2. Investors in each
market hold only the assets in their market. Half of these investors buy information about
either S1 or K1.
PUST P
UK
T
Correlation with (PS1 + PS2) 0.70 0.60
Correlation with (PK1 + PK2) 0.90 0.73
Table 1: Simulated asset markets (US and UK) that have one asset T in common. The
payoffs and asset supply shocks for T are identical in both markets. Asset payoff covariances
are: σT,K1 = .8, σT,K2 = .8, σK1,K2 = .5, σT,S1 = .65, σT,S2 = .65, σS1,S2 = .5. λ = 0.5. 10,000
iterations.
Since the shares of T traded in each market are identical assets, we would expect for
them to have the same correlations with each market. This result underlines the main point
that asset prices can be influenced by the prices of other assets being traded in the same
market, when information about assets is incomplete.
3.3 Decreasing Covmovement over Time
Asset price comovement has been steadily decreasing in the U.S and emerging markets
(Morck, Yeung, Yu 2000). At the same time, information technology has made the collection
and dissemination of information easier. According to the model, falling information costs
can cause a more diverse set of signals to be supplied to investors. Instead of learning
about one asset in an industry when information was very expensive, investors now have
detailed firm-level information available at low cost. Proposition 4 says that more detailed
information moves market prices closer to full-information pricing, which exhibits no excess
covariance.
4 Conclusion
As the same piece of information is being simultaneously incorporated into many asset
prices by a large number of investors, it causes the prices to move in a correlated way, even if
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the asset payoffs are uncorrelated. By supplying the highest-value information, information
markets naturally supply signals that are relevant for many asset prices. By supplying signals
at the lowest possible cost, information markets ensure that the same signals are provided
to many investors.
When thinking about what information will be supplied by information markets, the
analysis has focused on signals about asset payoffs. However, there is a whole spectrum of
asset-payoff relevant information that could be rationally supplied and could produce co-
movement. For example, if a component of each asset’s payoff was due to movements in the
unemployment rate, then discovering and selling unemployment data might be an equilib-
rium outcome. Alternatively, many assets with uncorrelated payoffs could have correlated
prices if investors observe a market index that is a weighted sum of the assets’ payoffs. For
comovement to arise, it is not so important what people learn about, as long as the infor-
mation is relevant for valuing many assets. When information is costly, this is exactly the
kind of high-value information that markets supply.
The analysis has focused on the simplest possible case, where there are three assets. This
too can be relaxed. As long as there are two or more assets being priced by the same noisy
signal, excess covariance can arise. With three assets, excess covariance disappears when two
signals are observed, because there is only one asset left being priced with noisy information.
If there were 100 assets, investors would have to purchase information about 99 of them
before all excess covariance disappeared. However, solving a model with many assets, using
the current method, is infeasible. Because the number of possible information portfolios is
the number of combinations of signals, the complexity of finding the optimal portfolio grows
exponentially.
The related phenomena of contagion, correlated outflows of foreign investment (Albu-
querque, Bauer and Schneider 2003), and cross-country asset price correlation (Shiller 1989),
could all be re-examined through the lens of information markets. Earlier research explains
the cross-market comovement of asset prices and real flows using investors’ portfolio rebal-
ancing decisions, arising either from a wealth shock (Kyle and Xiong 2001) or correlations
in fundamentals (Kodres and Pritsker 2002). These shocks can be magnified when there are
uninformed investors who cannot distinguish noise trading or portfolio rebalancing effects
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from bad news about asset payoffs (King and Wadhwani 1990). By characterizing optimal
information portfolios, this paper contributes to this line of research, explaining where and
when information asymmetry is likely to arise. But it also shifts the focus of the inquiry
from looking at properties of asset payoffs or noise trading, to the choice of information sets,
used to form expectations of assets’ values.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
If (12) holds, then cov(P2, P3) is higher when λ1 = 1 than when λ1 = 0. Price covariance with λ ² (0, 1) is
E[PP ′] = BΣB′ + σ2xCC
′. (18)
Note that (14), (15) and (18) are all continuous functions of λ. The covariance of P2 and P3 is the (2,3)
entry of the E[PP ′] matrix. If this covariance is higher at λ = 1 than at λ = 0 and varies continuously in λ
for all λ ² (0, 1), then there must be some region Λ ⊂ (0, 1) where covariance in increasing in Λ. 2
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof : If λ2 = 1, the price of asset 2 is the full-information price P2 = 1R (θ2 − aσ2²x2). The price of asset 3
is 1R (E[θ3|θ1, θ2] − aV3x2), where V3 = σ2η − Σ(1 : 2, 3)′Σ(1 : 2, 1 : 2)−1Σ(1 : 2, 3). The covariance between
these two prices is
cov(P2, P3) = E[η2E[η3|η1, η2]] + ρ2E[θ2θ3]
= σ23 + ρ
2
1−ρ2σ23 =
1
1−ρ2σ23
which is the same as the covariance between full-information prices. Proposition 2.1 shows that when
σ23 <
σ12σ13
σ2η
, then the price covariance when [λ1, λ2, λ3] = [1, 1, 0]. is less than when [λ1, λ2, λ3] = [1, 0, 0].
Therefore, by continuity of price covariance in λ (established proposition 2.2), there must be some non-empty
region Λ where cov(P2, P3) is decreasing in λ2. 2
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